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ABSTRACT: This paper is a tribute to Delia Graff Fara. It extends her work on failures of meta-rules (conditional proof, 
RAA, contraposition, disjunction elimination) for validity as truth-preservation under a supervaluationist 
identification of truth with supertruth. She showed that such failures occur even in languages without special 
vagueness-related operators, for standards of deductive reasoning as materially rather than purely logically good, 
depending on a context-dependent background. This paper extends her argument to: quantifier meta-rules like 
existential elimination; ambiguity; deliberately vague standard mathematical notation. Supervaluationist at-
tempts to qualify the meta-rules impose unreasonable cognitive demands on reasoning and underestimate her 
challenge.
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RESUMEN: Este artículo es un tributo a Delia Graff Fara. Extiende su trabajo acerca del colapso de las metareglas 
(prueba condicional, reductio ad absurdum, contraposición, eliminación de la disyunción) para la validez en-
tendida como preservación de la verdad bajo una identificación de la verdad con superverdad. Graff Fara de-
mostró que dicho colapso se da incluso en lenguajes que no poseen operadores especiales relacionados con la va-
guedad, para estándares de razonamiento deductivo tanto material como lógicamente correctos, dependiendo 
de factores sensibles al contexto. En este artículo se extiende su argumento a: meta-reglas cuantificacionales, 
como la eliminación existencial; ambigüedad; notación matemática estándar deliberadamente vaga. Los inten-
tos supervaluacionistas de cualificar las meta-reglas imponen exigencias cognitivas poco cabales sobre el razona-
miento y subestiman sus retos.
Palabras clave: Delia Graff Fara, supervaluacionismo, superverdad, validez global, vaguedad, sorites, ambigüedad, meta-
regla.
The word I most associate with Delia Graff Fara is ‘sharp’—sharp philosophy, sharp wit, 
sharp Delia. I first met her in early 1994, as a visiting professor at MIT. She came to my 
graduate class on vagueness, based on the proofs of my forthcoming book (Williamson 
1994). The other students included Jason Stanley (my TA), Zoltán Szabó, Kathrin Ko-
slicki, and Steven Gross; Judith Jarvis Thomson and Paul Horwich came from the faculty. 
I can, I hope, take some of the credit for sparking Delia’s interest in vagueness. She was cau-
tiously quiet in class, but towards the end of the semester presented me with rough notes 
for what later developed into ‘Phenomenal Continua and the Sorites’ (Graff 2001). I was 
struck by her ruthless application of precise mathematics to what might look on the surface 
like hopelessly recalcitrant material. Of course, the brilliantly creative and ingenious ideas 
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about vagueness for which she is known are categorically hers. Still, I was gratified when I 
once suggested to her that her distinctively interest-relative theory of vagueness in ‘Shifting 
Sands’ (Graff 2000) has a layer of epistemicism in its foundations; she immediately agreed.1
Delia and her husband Michael became my good friends, as well as my co-authors 
(Graff and Williamson 2002; Fara and Williamson 2005). My paper on higher-order 
vagueness (Williamson 1999) emerged out of extended conversation and email exchanges 
with her; together, we worked through the drawbacks of one proposal after another about 
how to define nth-order vagueness. We had a constructive exchange on the mathemati-
cal consequences of epistemicist models of vagueness (Graff 2002; Williamson 2002). The 
more technical a problem got, the more Delia relished it, while never losing sight of the big-
ger philosophical picture. When I was invited to edit an anthology on vagueness, I asked 
her to co-edit it with me, because I trusted her judgment; also, her knowledge of the recent 
literature was better than mine. We wrote the introduction together (Graff and William-
son 2002).
In discussion, Delia was in the best way a stickler for accuracy and precision. If her 
point, typically a steely-sharp point, was not properly answered, she would politely but re-
lentlessly insist. She would accept no diplomatic fudge. But she was the opposite of grim, 
the first to see the funny side. She was exactly the kind of person philosophy can least spare: 
a temptation fate would not resist.
The present paper takes up one of Delia’s lesser-known contributions to the theory of 
vagueness, an insight whose significance has, I believe, been underestimated. I will explain 
her idea, illustrate extensions of it, and argue that attempts to deny it vastly underestimate 
the difficulty of meeting her challenge. It concerns supervaluationist theories of vagueness.
1. Background
Supervaluationists treat vagueness as a kind of semantic underdetermination. The commu-
nity’s use of its language fails to determine unique semantic values for its expressions. Many 
different assignments are in some (under-explained) sense compatible with use—even in a 
given context (this relativity to context will henceforth be left tacit). Call those assignments 
compatible with use reasonable. There is nothing vague in any one such assignment, consid-
ered in itself. A given sentence is either true on a given assignment or false on that assign-
ment, and not both.2 The vagueness consists in the multiplicity of reasonable assignments. 
In particular, a sentence is borderline if it is true on some reasonable assignments and false 
on others: its use and the world together underdetermine its truth-value. By contrast, a sen-
tence is supertrue if and only if it is true on every reasonable assignment, and superfalse if 
and only if it is false on every reasonable assignment. The borderline sentences are those 
which are neither supertrue nor superfalse.
1 Delia characterizes herself as an epistemicist at Graff 2003, 216. Elsewhere she comments that bounda-
ry-shifting theories of vagueness, whether contextualist or her own interest-relative invariantist theory, 
‘are not in competition with any particular account of what it is to be a borderline case of a vague pred-
icate’ (Graff Fara 2010, 379n13).
2 For simplicity, the object-language is assumed to contain only declarative sentences.
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Traditional supervaluationism identifies truth with supertruth and falsity with super-
falsity, not with truth and falsity respectively on the intended assignment, because there is 
no intended assignment. Use determines only supertruth and superfalsity. Thus every the-
orem of classical logic is true, because supertrue, because true on every reasonable assign-
ment. That includes all instances of the law of excluded middle. However, not every sen-
tence of a vague language is either true or false, because borderline sentences are neither 
supertrue nor superfalse. Consequently, standard disquotational biconditionals for truth 
are held to fail.
A variant form of supervaluationism identifies truth with disquotational truth 
rather than supertruth (McGee and McLaughlin 1994). An ascription of disquotational 
truth to a sentence α is true on an assignment if and only if α itself is true on that as-
signment. This variant has the advantage over the traditional version of making stand-
ard disquotational principles for truth come out true, indeed supertrue. It also has the 
result that every sentence is either true or false. However, as a consequence, although 
its proponents are officially anti-epistemicist, they have the greatest difficulty in distin-
guishing their view from a form of epistemicism (Williamson 1994, 162-4; 2004). The 
present paper concerns only the more standard form of supervaluationism, which iden-
tifies truth with supertruth, and falsity with superfalsity. This view goes back to the 
1950s (Williamson 1994, 143-6). A classic exposition is by Kit Fine (1975), though he 
no longer holds the view. A contemporary defender of standard-form supervaluation-
ism is Rosanna Keefe (2000).
Speakers may wish to talk in the object-language about borderline status. The natural 
way to do that is by adding an operator D, read ‘definitely’, corresponding to supertruth, to 
the object-language. A borderline case is neither definitely on one side nor definitely on the 
other. The idea is roughly that, for any sentence α, Dα is true on an assignment if and only 
if α is true on every reasonable assignment.
We can easily turn these ideas into a simple model theory for a formal propositional 
language with a D operator and a standard set of truth-functors. A model is an ordered pair 
<W, V>, where W is a nonempty set, whose members are known as points (rather than the 
worlds of modal logic); informally, we think of them as the reasonable assignments; V is a 
function mapping each atomic formula of the language to a subset of W, the set of points 
at which it is true. In a given model, if a formula α is true at every point, then Dα is also true 
at every point in W; otherwise, Dα is false at every point in W. The semantics for the truth-
functors is as usual: ¬α is true at a point w if and only if α is not true at w, α ∨ β is true at 
w if and only if α is true at w or β is true at w, and so on. Correspondingly, α is supertrue in 
the model if and only if α is true at every point, in which case so is Dα; α is superfalse in the 
model if and only if α is false at every point, in which case so is D¬α. Whereas models for 
modal logic often have one designated world, informally conceived as the ‘actual’ world, su-
pervaluationist models have no designated point, because there is not meant to be an ‘in-
tended’ world.
What is the appropriate model-theoretic relation of logical consequence in this setting? 
One proposal is that a valid argument is one that preserves truth at any given point in any 
given model, which is known as local validity:
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Local validity
Г D L α = def for every model <W, V> and w ∈ W, if γ is true at w in <W, V> for all γ ∈ Г, 
then α is true at w in <W, V>.
Formally, local validity is a nice classical consequence relation, but it does not suit 
the spirit of standard supervaluationism. For validity is supposed to be truth-preserva-
tion, and standard supervaluationists equate genuine truth with supertruth, not with 
truth on a given assignment. For them, a genuinely valid argument is one that pre-
serves supertruth in any given model, a different consequence relation known as global 
validity:
Global validity
Г D G α = def for every model <W, V>, if γ is true at w in <W, V> for all γ ∈ Г and w ∈ W, 
then α is true at w in <W, V> for all w ∈ W.
Kit Fine (1975), Rosanna Keefe (2000, 174) and many others have treated global valid-
ity as the appropriate consequence relation for supervaluationism.
As so often with vagueness, there is a catch: higher-order vagueness. ‘Reasonable’ is it-
self vague, which makes D vague too, so its semantic value and that of many sentences con-
taining it should themselves vary from one reasonable assignment to another. In the sim-
ple semantics just sketched, in any given model, for any given formula α, Dα is true at every 
point or none, so DDα ∨ D¬Dα is valid (both globally and locally). In other words, it is al-
ways definite whether something is definitely so. Yet ‘definitely red’ seems just as sorites-
susceptible as ‘red’, and so on for other cases of vagueness. Some supervaluationists have 
denied that D can be expected to measure its own vagueness (Keefe 2000, 210). However, 
there is nothing obviously inconsistent or unintelligible in the hypothesis that it is indefi-
nite whether something is definite.
A more natural strategy for the supervaluationist is to follow the example of mo-
dal logic, where Kripke showed how to implement model-theoretically its being con-
tingent whether something is necessary, by introducing an accessibility relation R be-
tween worlds. Informally, a world x is accessible from a world w if and only if x would 
be possible if w obtained. Formally, α is true at w if and only if α is true at every world 
x such that Rwx. Since two worlds may differ in which worlds are accessible from them, 
α may be true at one and false at the other. The supervaluationist analogue is to im-
plement model-theoretically its being indefinite whether something is definite, by in-
troducing an accessibility relation R between points. Informally, an assignment x is ac-
cessible from an assignment w if and only if x is reasonable according to w. Formally, Dα 
is true at w if and only if α is true at every point x such that Rwx. Since two points may 
differ in which points are accessible from them, Dα may be true at one and false at the 
other. In effect, each assignment makes its own determinations of which assignments 
are reasonable.
The only formal constraint on the accessibility relation imposed here is reflexivity: 
every assignment is reasonable according to itself. This validates the plausible principle that 
whatever is definitely so is indeed so (Dα → α). If accessibility is also symmetric and transi-
tive, then it is an equivalence relation, which validates the analogue for D of the strong mo-
dal logic S5; in particular, it validates the problematic theorem DDα ∨ D¬Dα. However, 
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that principle can be shown to fail whenever accessibility is either non-symmetric or non-
transitive, but still reflexive.3
Supervaluationist models are now triples <W, R, V>, where W and V are as before and 
R is the accessibility relation. Since the point of the D operator is to represent supertruth in 
the object-language, supertruth must now be defined at a point: in the model, α is supertrue 
at w if and only if Dα is true at w, which in turn is so if and only α is true at all points x such 
that Rwx. Since validity is meant to be truth-preservation, and standard supervaluationists 
equate genuine truth with supertruth, in the setting of this more sophisticated model the-
ory they should regard a genuinely valid argument as one that preserves supertruth at any 
given point in any given model. That is not global validity but what, following Cobreros 
(2008), we may call regional validity (Williamson 1994, 297 n32):4
Regional validity
Г D R α =def for every model <W, R, V> and w ∈ W, if γ is true at w* in <W, R, V> for all 
γ ∈ Г and w* such that Rww*, then α is true at w* in <W, R, V> for all w* such that Rww*.
The main considerations in this paper are independent of higher-order vagueness. Al-
though we leave room for it by not requiring accessibility to be an equivalence relation, the 
arguments still work even if that constraint is imposed. Indeed, they work for both regional 
validity and global validity; for convenience, some will be stated just in terms of regional va-
lidity. Although other accounts of validity have been proposed within a supervaluationist 
setting (Williamson 1994, 148; Varzi 2007; Williams 2008), the standard of regional valid-
ity is rooted in a very natural line of thought from a standard supervaluationist perspective. 
If supervaluationists abandon it, they incur the suspicion that they are not serious about 
their identification of truth with supertruth.
In the fragment of the language without the D operator, global validity, regional valid-
ity, and classical validity all coincide. For if the argument from Г to α is classically invalid, 
then on some assignment all formulas in Г are true while α is false; that assignment can be 
turned into a supervaluationist model with just one point, at which all formulas in Г are su-
pertrue while α is superfalse, so the argument is globally and regionally invalid too. Con-
versely, if the argument is classically valid, then it preserves truth on any given assignment, 
so it preserves truth at any given point in any given supervaluationist model, since the rest 
of the model makes no difference to the evaluation of D-less formulas, the argument is glo-
bally valid too.
Even in the full language with D, classical truth-functional validity still entails global 
and regional validity. More precisely, if the argument from Γ to α is classically valid and D-
free, then it is also globally and regionally valid, so for any uniform substitution σ into the 
3 One would not expect ‘x is reasonable according to w’ to be a transitive relation (Williamson 1994, 
159). Indeed, arguments against the S4 principle Dα → DDα, corresponding to transitivity, can be 
modelled on some arguments against the analogous KK principle for knowledge, even within the su-
pervaluationist framework (Williamson 1994, 217-226; 1999). For arguments against the B principle 
α → D¬D¬α, corresponding to symmetry, see Mahtani 2008 and Dorr 2015. For a theory of vague-
ness on which transitivity holds but symmetry fails, see Bobzien 2011.
4 The distinction between global and regional validity is also involved in the debate between Cobreros 
(2008) and Graff Fara (2011) on higher-order vagueness.
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full language, the argument from σΓ to σα is also globally and regionally valid, because both 
global validity and regional validity are closed under uniform substitution. In that narrow 
sense, the logics of global validity and regional validity are classical.
In a broader sense, however, the logics of global validity and regional validity are non-
classical. For they violate some standard meta-rules, rules connecting the validity of several 
arguments. In particular, they violate meta-rules involving the discharge of premises (Wil-
liamson 1994, 151-2, 297n32). They include conditional proof, otherwise known as the 
deduction theorem and as the introduction rule for the conditional (if Γ ∪ {α} entails β 
then Γ entails α → β), reductio ad absurdum (if Γ ∪ {α} entails the contradiction ⊥, then Γ 
entails ¬α), argument by cases, otherwise known as the elimination rule for disjunction (if 
Γ ∪ {α} entails γ and Δ ∪ {β} also entails γ, then Γ ∪ Δ ∪ {α ∨ β} entails γ), and contraposi-
tion (if Γ ∪ {α} entails β then Γ ∪ {¬β} entails ¬α). Such rules are of course frequently used 
in ordinary deductive reasoning, not least in mathematics.
To see how the failure happens in the case of conditional proof, consider the formula 
p ∧ ¬Dp, where p is atomic. Suppose that, in a model <W, R, V>, p ∧ ¬Dp is supertrue at 
some w ∈ W. Thus p is supertrue at w, so p is true at all w* such that Rww*. Similarly, ¬Dp 
is supertrue at w, so ¬Dp is true, and Dp false, at all w* such that Rww*. But R is reflexive, 
by hypothesis, so Rww, so Dp is false at w, so p is false at some w* such that Rww*, by the se-
mantic clause for D. Thus p is both true and false at some w*: a contradiction. So p ∧ ¬Dp 
is not supertrue at any point in any model. Consequently, the argument from {p ∧ ¬Dp} 
to any conclusion, including ⊥, is vacuously regionally valid: {p ∧ ¬Dp} DR ⊥. Hence, if 
DR obeys conditional proof, DR (p ∧ ¬Dp) → ⊥, so DR p → Dp, since the two formulas 
are truth-functionally equivalent. But a supervaluationist counter-model to p → Dp can 
be built from any accessibility relation that holds between two points, so not DR p → Dp. 
Thus regional validity violates conditional proof. By a similar argument, global validity 
also violates conditional proof. Under supervaluationism, restricting the models to validate 
conditional proof would mean ruling out vagueness.
Similar arguments show that global validity and regional validity also violate reductio 
ad absurdum, argument by cases, and contraposition, since conditional proof is derivable 
from any one of those meta-rules in this setting.5, 6
5 Proof: Suppose that Γ ∪ {α} entails β. Hence Γ ∪ {α ∧ ¬β} entails ⊥. Hence, by reductio ad absur-
dum, Γ entails ¬(α ∧ ¬β); equally, by contraposition, Γ ∪ {¬⊥} entails ¬(α ∧ ¬β); in both cases, Γ en-
tails α → β. Also, from the original supposition, Γ ∪ {α} entails α → β. Moreover, {¬α} entails α → β. 
Hence, by argument by cases, Γ entails α → β. The proofs assume that any set of premises entails its 
classical truth-functional consequences and that entailment obeys the standard structural rules for log-
ical consequence, in particular the cut rule; these assumptions hold for both global and regional valid-
ity.
6 One can also consider an alternative consequence relation that holds between premises and conclusion 
if and only if (i) whenever the conjunction of the premises is supertrue, the conclusion is superfalse and 
(ii) whenever the conclusion is superfalse then the conjunction of the premises is superfalse. However, 
since p ∧ ¬Dp is never supertrue, ¬(p ∧ ¬Dp) is never superfalse, so p ∧ ¬Dp entails ¬(p ∧ ¬Dp) vacu-
ously in this new sense; thus (p ∧ ¬Dp) → ¬(p ∧ ¬Dp) and so p → Dp would be valid if this new sense 
validated conditional proof, which it consequently does not. Moreover, since p ∧ ¬Dp entails each of 
p ∧ ¬Dp and ¬(p ∧ ¬Dp) but not their conjunction in the new sense, it does not provide the conjunc-
tion introduction rule.
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The meta-rules are defined in terms of the given consequence relation for the language, 
in this case global or regional validity. Thus whether the meta-rules hold for a language su-
pervenes on the consequence relation for that language; no difference in the former with-
out a difference in the latter. For the D-free fragment, they all hold for global and regional 
validity because they coincide with classical truth-functional validity, for which they hold. 
They can fail for global and regional validity in the language with D only because there no 
such coincidence obtains.7
Some confusion arose about the status of the meta-rules for global validity because 
Kit Fine originally illustrated the failure of conditional proof for global validity with the 
argument from p to Dp (Fine 1975: 290), which is globally valid, even though the for-
mula p → Dp is not globally valid. By contrast, Dp is not a regional consequence of p, 
since the supertruth of p at a point does not imply the supertruth of Dp at that point in 
a model with a non-transitive accessibility relation. This misled some authors (not Fine) 
into denying that the meta-rules fail once higher-order vagueness is taken into account. 8 
The example used earlier shows that all the meta-rules at issue fail for both global and re-
gional validity even when account is taken of higher-order vagueness (Williamson 1994, 
297n32). The proof works when the accessibility relation is (harmlessly) constrained to 
be reflexive in all models, whether or not it is also constrained to be symmetric and tran-
sitive.
As usual, one can complicate the model theory and the models to avoid the inconven-
ient results, for instance by making the argument from {p ∧ ¬Dp} to ⊥ invalid in another 
sense. Such effects are typical artefacts of building too many degrees of freedom into one’s 
models.9 On a more appropriate model theory for supervaluationism, like that above, the 
four meta-rules at issue do indeed fail for the relevant standard of validity.
Supervaluationists have used their semantic framework to provide semantic accounts 
of comparative and superlative adjectives and of modifiers such as ‘rather’, ‘in a sense’, and 
‘-ish’, starting with work by David Lewis (1972, 216) and Hans Kamp (1975, 137-45). 
Such accounts generate further violations of the meta-rules for global and regional validity 
(Williamson 1994, 295-6n25). Thus the violations are not confined to arguments with a 
‘definitely’-like operator; they also occur in the presence of more innocuous-looking natu-
ral language constructions.
Reasoning to a standard of global or regional validity seems to be a tricky business. 
Some supervaluationists have responded by proposing non-standard variants of the me-
7 Unclarity on which object-language the meta-rules concern vitiates the objection in Hjortland 2017, 
639-40 to the account of logical consequence in Williamson 2013, 92-5 and 2017.
8 See McGee and McLaughlin 1997, 224, to which Williamson 2004, 119-20 replies; they later ac-
knowledged the slip (McGee and McLaughlin 2004, 134).
9 An example is Williams 2008, where each model has both an accessibility relation over all deline-
ations (points) and an independently specified subset of delineations, whose members are called 
sharpenings. Supertruth in a model is defined as truth on all sharpenings, and ‘global’ validity as 
preservation of supertruth in each model. Key arguments then exploit models where, for each de-
lineation, the set of accessible delineations differs from the set of sharpenings; thus the model’s own 
view of which delineations are ‘reasonable’ differs from that of any delineation countenanced within 
the model. This flouts the point of the D operator, which is to project supertruth into the object-
language. 
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ta-rules that avoid such counterexamples. For instance, Rosanna Keefe suggests formula-
tions in which D is inserted at appropriate points into the concluding argument (2000, 
179-81). Her modified form of conditional proof states that if Γ ∪ {α} entails β then Γ en-
tails Dα → β, which holds for global validity in the simple models with no accessibility rela-
tion, and for regional validity in the models with such a relation. However, it fails for global 
validity in the more complex models, since the argument from p to DDp is globally valid, 
but Dp → DDp is not. By contrast, McGee and McLaughlin avoid inserting D by in effect 
restricting the reasoning from Γ ∪ {α} to β to ‘modes of inference that are known to pre-
serve truth in each acceptable model’ (2004, 135; their framework is slightly different from 
mine). Williams (2008) suggests a version where the argument from Γ ∪ {α} to β is valid by 
one standard while the argument from Γ to α → β is valid by another.
Is ordinary deductive reasoning in science—for instance, in drawing consequences 
from a theory—sensitive to any of the proposed restrictions on the meta-rules? That is far 
from obvious. Still, supervaluationists might claim that the restrictions are rarely needed, 
and if we occasionally violate them, that is our fault.
The debate has sometimes focussed on whether the contested meta-rules are ‘part of 
classical logic’. That has not been very fruitful. They are in a broad sense of ‘classical logic’, 
but not in a narrower sense. A more interesting question is how much of our deductive 
practice will be lost if the meta-rules are restricted.
2. Graff Fara’s contribution
Graff Fara discusses the more interesting question in the latter half of her seminal paper 
‘Gap Principles, Penumbral Consequence, and Infinitely Higher-Order Vagueness’ (Graff 
2003). A component of the supervaluationist defence had been that the problems for the 
meta-rules arise only when operators that trade on vagueness are in play: for instance, in 
English, ‘definitely’, ‘rather’, ‘in a sense’, ‘-ish’, and perhaps ‘-er’. As Rosanna Keefe put 
it, ‘the cases in which these rules fail all involve the D operator (or similar such devices)’ 
(2000: 178). Graff Fara showed that this was not so.
Graff Fara’s examples involve arguments in ordinary English, evaluated according to 
supervaluationist semantics.10 The standard of validity she applies is not meant to be purely 
logical; rather, she intends a lower standard, one more relevant to reasoning in at least some 
contexts. She assumes, very plausibly, that in much of our deductive reasoning we intend 
the truth of the premises in some sense to guarantee the truth of the conclusion, but we 
do not care whether the guarantee is purely logical or instead depends on a shared conver-
sational background. For example, the argument from ‘It’s red’ to ‘It’s coloured’ is good 
enough for the purposes of most contexts, even though its validity is not strictly logical. It 
might be called a standard of materially good deduction. In model-theoretic terms, the su-
pervaluationist may naturally conceive such a standard of material goodness as restricting 
the models, and points within those models, with respect to which regional validity is as-
sessed.
10 Her model-theoretic framework differs slightly from the present one, but not in ways that matter for 
present purposes.
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Here is one of Graff Fara’s examples (Graff 2003, 208). First consider argument IIB 
(her tag):
Argument IIB
X is tall.
Y is not tall.
Therefore, X is more than a millimetre taller than Y.
In some contexts, the supertruth of the premises of IIB guarantees the supertruth of its 
conclusion. For, given how vague ‘tall’ is, the borderline zone is definitely more than a mil-
limetre wide (if you doubt that, Graff Fara invites you to work with a smaller distance). 
Hence, if X is definitely tall and Y is definitely not tall, then X is definitely more than a 
millimetre taller than Y. Thus IIB is regionally valid in the relevant material sense. Now 
try contraposing the second premise and the conclusion of IIB, and deleting the double 
negation in the conclusion (the latter being a harmless move for a supervaluationist). The 
result is IIA:
Argument IIA
X is tall.
X is no more than a millimetre taller than Y.
Therefore, Y is tall.
Argument IIA is not regionally valid in the relevant material sense. If X is definitely tall, 
and definitely no more than a millimetre taller than Y, Y may still not be definitely tall. As 
Graff Fara points out, IIA generates a sorites paradox for tallness, even by supervaluationist 
standards, while IIB does not.11 Thus contraposition fails from IIB to IIA.
Strictly speaking, both arguments involve the comparative operators ‘more’ and ‘-er’, 
whose semantics may be given in a supervaluationist framework. This is an inessential fea-
ture. We could replace the conclusion of IIB and the second premise of IIA with a sen-
tence in mathematical notation about the relative heights of X and Y. In Graff Fara’s other 
main example, the role of ‘is no more than a millimetre taller than’ is played by ‘looks the 
same as’, which is not a comparative in the relevant sense (Graff 2003, 215-17; ‘looks red’ 
plays the role of ‘is tall’). Neither ‘definitely’ nor any similar device occurs in the premises 
or conclusions of the spruced-up versions of IIA or IIB. Of course, they contain the vague 
adjective ‘tall’, but that is quite different from containing an operator, such as ‘definitely’, 
‘rather’, or ‘-ish’, whose function involves interacting with vagueness in some way. Virtu-
ally any argument in natural language contains some vagueness. The putative failure of the 
meta-rules would be a limited phenomenon if it arose only for arguments containing opera-
tors that trade on vagueness; to say that it arises only for arguments containing vague terms 
is hardly any limitation at all.
11 To generate a sorites paradox from multiple instances of IIA, one needs the structural rule of Cut: if Г 
entails α and Δ ∪ {α} entails β then Г ∪ Δ entails β. Cut holds even for restricted versions of regional 
validity, for if all members of Г ∪ Δ are supertrue at a point w, then α is supertrue at w if the argument 
from Г to α preserves supertruth, so β is supertrue at w if the argument from Δ ∪ {α} to β preserves su-
pertruth; likewise for global validity.
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Could a supervaluationist maintain that since the operative standard of validity is su-
pertruth-preservation, and the D operator is a device for explicitness about supertruth in 
the object-language, D is implicitly present in all these arguments? As Graff Fara points 
out, that defence burns supervaluationism with friendly fire, by making D far more gener-
ally present than it appears to be (Graff 2003, 218).
A more discriminating idea is that to appreciate the material regional validity of IIB 
one must in effect think about vagueness in a way not required for appreciating mate-
rial regional validity in most arguments containing vague terms. For clearly, if ‘tall’ were 
precise, IIB would be materially regionally invalid, even though the conditional proba-
bility of the conclusion on the premises might be high. The key to its material regional 
validity is the width of the borderline zone between the definitely tall and the definitely 
non-tall.
In response, the supervaluationist might point out that we rarely accept arguments like 
IIB, so the problem with contraposing them rarely arises. However, drawing attention to 
the unnaturalness of IIB is a dangerous move for a supervaluationist to make. For IIB itself 
feels far less compelling than does the step of contraposition from IIB to IIA, even if one re-
duces the distance at issue from a millimetre to something much less (but not zero). If one 
wants to avoid being drawn into the soritical argument IIA, the pre-theoretically natural 
way to do it is by not accepting IIB in the first place, rather than by accepting IIB and then 
refusing to contrapose. However materially restricted, regional validity does not come nat-
urally as a standard for judging the material goodness of vague deductive arguments in one’s 
native language. That is awkward for the supervaluationist who proffers regional validity as 
the appropriate standard.
Of course, native speakers may be confused about the logic of their own language. Nev-
ertheless, supervaluationists have typically defended their account of the logic of vague lan-
guages by arguing that it is not seriously revisionary of inferential practice. But if we avoid 
reliance on those numerous instances of the meta-rules condemned by supervaluationists 
only because we are unwilling to rely on numerous object-language arguments (like IIA) 
endorsed by supervaluationists, their account is still highly revisionary.
The case of IIA and IIB is far from an isolated example. Similar pairs of arguments can 
be constructed for any sorites-susceptible term. Graff Fara has presented a deadly serious 
challenge to the supervaluationist account of deductive validity for vague languages.12
3. Extensions
In this section, I present some variations on Graff Fara’s theme. In the final section, I will 
comment on the prospects for restricting the meta-rules in the ways supervaluationists have 
proposed.
12 In Graff 2003, Graff Fara draws together her argument about supervaluationist consequence relations 
with considerations about higher-order vagueness from the first half of the paper to complete an argu-
ment against supervaluationist treatments of higher-order vagueness. In Graff Fara 2010, she extends 
her critique of supervaluationist accounts of the logic of vague languages. There is no space here to dis-
cuss these powerful further arguments.
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3.1. Ambiguity
In his classic presentation of a supervaluationist treatment of vagueness, Kit Fine describes 
vagueness as ‘ambiguity on a grand and systematic scale’, and gives it a supervaluationist 
treatment: ‘an ambiguous sentence is true if true for all disambiguations’ (Fine 1975, 282; 
Keefe 2000, 156-8 rejects the analogy). It is therefore significant that Graff Fara’s point ap-
plies even to the very simplest kind of ambiguity, under the supervaluationist treatment, in 
a language with no D operator or similar devices.
We start with a standard propositional language L, assumed free of vagueness, ambi-
guity, and additional operators. The semantics is the standard bivalent one, for which clas-
sical propositional logic is sound and complete. Let p and q be two atomic sentences in L; 
thus the semantics treats them as logically independent. We now expand L to a language L+ 
by adding one new atomic sentence r. The idea is to make r ambiguous between just two 
meanings, one that of p, the other that of q. For simplicity, we can identify points in the 
models for L+ with ordered pairs <a, j>, where a is an assignment of truth-values to atomic 
sentences of L and j is either 0 (flagging that r is disambiguated as p) or 1 (flagging that r is 
disambiguated as q). Thus any atomic sentence other than r is true at <a, j> if and only if it 
is true on a; r is true at <a, 0> if and only if p is true on a; r is true at <a, 1> if and only if q 
is true on a. The models for L+ correspond one-one with the original assignments a, where 
the set of points in the corresponding model is just {<a, 0>, <a, 1>}. The two points in any 
model are accessible from each other and from themselves; thus accessibility is always an 
equivalence relation. This implements the idea that supertruth is just truth on both disam-
biguations of r, the only source of ambiguity or vagueness in L+. Of course, when the mod-
els are restricted like this, the resulting regional consequence relation DR is not purely logi-
cal, since a non-logical constraint on the truth-value of r has been built in, but that is just 
what we want for Graff Fara’s point.
Some simple observations can now be made.
[a] r DR p, for if r is supertrue at <a, j> in a model, then r is true at <a, 0> in the model, 
so p is true on a, so p is true at both <a, 0> and <a, 1>, so p is supertrue at <a, j>.
[b] r DR q, by an argument like that for [a].
[c] r DR p ↔ q, from [a] and [b] because p ↔ q follows classically from p and q.
[d] ¬r DR ¬p, by an argument like that for [a].
[e] ¬r DR ¬q, by an argument like that for [a].
[f] ¬r DR p ↔ q, from [d] and [e], as for [c].
Consequently, if DR obeys argument by cases, r ∨ ¬r DR p ↔ q from [c] and [f], so 
DR p ↔ q. But that is not so, for the semantics makes p and q mutually independent.
The other meta-rules fail similarly. For instance, conditional proof and contraposition 
fail, since r DR p but neither DR r → p nor ¬p DR ¬r. Similarly, reductio ad absurdum fails 
because ¬p, r DR ⊥ but not ¬p DR ¬r. Under regional validity, the contested meta-rules en-
able one to exploit the ambiguity of r to treat its two readings as equivalent to each other.
The failure of the meta-rules does not depend on the simplicity of the example. The 
proof can be adapted to much more complex cases of ambiguity, involving other grammati-
cal categories, more than two readings, pre-existing ambiguity and vagueness in the object-
language, and so on. Moreover, as already emphasized, it does not depend on the presence 
of any special operators in the object-language for dealing with vagueness or ambiguity.
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3.2. Quantifier rules
Although the failure of meta-rules for regional validity is usually discussed in the setting of 
propositional logic, it also affects some meta-rules for quantifiers. An example is a standard 
elimination rule for the existential quantifier: if from  Γ ∪ {α(c)} one can derive β, and the con-
stant c occurs nowhere in Г, α(x), or β, then from Γ ∪ {∃x α(x)} one can also derive β (with the 
usual restriction to avoid clash of variables in ∃x α(x)). In effect, this rule permits one to use an 
‘arbitrary name’ in working out the consequences of an existential premise. For regional valid-
ity, the rule says that if Γ ∪ {α(c)} DR β then Γ ∪ {∃x α(x)} DR β, subject to the same restrictions.
To assess the rule, we must extend the model theory to handle quantifiers and indi-
vidual variables. The main choice-point in doing so is whether we allow variation in the 
quantifier domain from one point of evaluation to another, corresponding to vagueness 
in how far the quantifiers range. To keep things simple, we assume that there is no such 
vagueness. In particular, we may specify that the quantifiers range precisely over the nat-
ural numbers. If the result is a non-logical consequence relation, that is consonant with 
Graff Fara’s argument. However, for the time being, we keep the operator D in the lan-
guage. Let F be a monadic atomic predicate, and j an arbitrary name. Thus, for the same 
reason as in §1, Fj and ¬DFj are never both supertrue at a point in a model (on an assign-
ment of values to variables). Since ¬∃n DFn is true only at those points where ¬DFj is true, 
¬∃n DFn is supertrue only at those points where ¬DFj is supertrue. Thus Fj and ¬∃n DFn 
are never both supertrue at a given point, so vacuously {¬∃n DFn, Fj} DR ⊥. Since j occurs 
nowhere in ¬∃n DFn and ⊥, the existential elimination rule at issue for regional validity 
tells us that {¬∃n DFn, ∃n Fn} DR ⊥. But that is not so. For consider a simple model where 
W = {j, …, j + k} (1 ≤ k), R is the universal relation over W, and the extension of F at i is 
{i} (j ≤ i ≤ j + k). Then ∃n Fn is true at every point in the model. But, on any assignment of 
natural numbers to variables, DFn is false at every point because Fn is false at some point, 
so ¬∃n DFn is true at every point. Thus the argument from ¬∃n DFn and ∃n Fn to ⊥ has 
supertrue premises and a superfalse conclusion at every point in the model.
The model has a natural supervaluationist interpretation. For we can read Fn as ‘n is 
small and n + 1 is not small’, where ‘small’ is of course vague. Thus each point in the model 
corresponds to a potential cut-off for ‘small’. On the standard supervaluationist view, it is 
definite both that there is a cut-off for smallness and that no number is definitely the cut-
off. Thus the counter-model to existential elimination respects the spirit as well as the let-
ter of supervaluationism. Admittedly, the model rules out higher-order vagueness, but one 
can easily tweak it to admit that phenomenon while still providing a counter-model to exis-
tential elimination.
That example depends on the D operator. But we can adapt Graff Fara’s own example 
to build a counterexample to existential elimination with no such operator. For consider 
these two sentences:
CUTOFF  Mary is tall and John is not tall and Mary is not more than a millimetre taller 
than John.
∃CUTOFF  For some X, for some Y, X is tall and Y is not tall and X is not more than a mil-
limetre taller than Y.
In the context Graff Fara envisages, CUTOFF is guaranteed not to be supertrue. Thus the 
argument from CUTOFF to a contradiction is materially regionally valid. Hence, if the ex-
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istential elimination rule for English preserves material regional validity, then the argument 
from ∃CUTOFF to a contradiction is also materially regionally valid, by two applications 
of the rule. But it is not. Given a sufficiently dense distribution of heights in the relevant 
population between the definitely tall and the definitely not tall, ∃CUTOFF is supertrue. 
Thus the existential elimination rule fails for material regional validity even in the absence 
of operators that trade on vagueness.
3.3. Mathematical notation
Contrary to stereotype, some standard mathematical notation is deliberately left vague and 
context-dependent. For instance, the symbol ≈ is often used for approximate equality, typi-
cally of real numbers. For mathematical convenience, the required degree of approximation 
is left unspecified. Such uses yield further examples of Graff Fara’s phenomenon.
We can see this by building a toy supervaluationist model of how ≈ works in some 
simple contexts. Suppose that on each assignment there is a constant δ such that for all 
real numbers x and y, x ≈ y if and only if the absolute difference |x – y| < δ.13 The value 
of δ is left vague: it varies from assignment to assignment, subject to the constraint that 
0 < a ≤ δ ≤ b, where the model fixes a and b assignment-independently. The assignments 
correspond one-one with the members of the closed interval [a, b]. All assignments are mu-
tually accessible; for simplicity, we exclude higher-order vagueness, but including it would 
only slightly complicate the argument. The width of the interval [a, b] measures the degree 
of vagueness of ‘δ’. We suppose that it is reasonably wide, in the sense that 2a ≤ b.
Now consider the set of formulas {x ≈ y, y ≈ z, ¬x ≈ z}, which describes a counter-ex-
ample to the transitivity of approximate equality. Suppose that all three formulas are super-
true together at some point in the model. Thus for all δ in [a, b], |x – y| < δ, |y – z| < δ, and 
|x – z| ≥ δ. Therefore, in particular, |x – y| < a, |y – z| < a, and |x – z| ≥ b. But then, by the 
triangle inequality for absolute difference:
b ≤ |x – z| ≤ |x – y| + |y – z| < 2a ≤ b
That is impossible, so the three formulas cannot be supertrue together. Thus the argu-
ment from {x ≈ y, y ≈ z, ¬x ≈ z} to a contradiction is regionally valid, in the material sense 
restricted to the context just described. Consequently, if this version of regional validity 
obeyed reductio ad absurdum, then the argument from {x ≈ y, y ≈ z} to x ≈ z would also 
be regionally valid. But it is not, for when x, y, and z take the values 0, 2a/3, and 4a/3 re-
spectively, the argument’s premises are supertrue while its conclusion is not. Indeed, multi-
ple instances of the argument from {x ≈ y, y ≈ z} to x ≈ z generate a sorites paradox, just as 
multiple instances of Graff Fara’s argument IIA did. From the same example one can eas-
ily construct counterexamples to the meta-rules of conditional proof, contraposition, argu-
ment by cases, and existential elimination too.
Another mathematical symbol deliberately left vague and context-dependent is 
<<: ‘x << y’ is read ‘x is much less than y’. It generates more examples of Graff Fara’s phe-
13 Pedantically speaking, the three object-language variables x, y, and z will be used in the meta-language 
for their values on the given assignment.
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nomenon. That is unsurprising, for ‘x << y’ is similar in meaning to ‘x < y and not x ≈ y’. 
We can treat ‘x << y’ as equivalent to ‘x + δ < y’ in models like those above, though perhaps 
for different values of a and b.
Now consider the set of formulas {¬x << y, ¬y << z, x << z}. Suppose that all three 
formulas are supertrue together at some point in such a model. Thus for all δ in [a, b], 
x + δ ≥ y, y + δ ≥ z, and x + δ < z; hence x + 2δ ≥ y + δ ≥ z. Therefore, in particular, 
x + b < z and x + 2a ≥ z, so b < 2a, contrary to hypothesis. Hence the three formulas can-
not be supertrue together. Thus the argument from {¬x << y, ¬y << z, x << z} to a contra-
diction is regionally valid, in the material sense restricted to this context. Consequently, if 
this version of regional validity obeyed reductio ad absurdum, the argument from {¬x << y, 
¬y << z} to ¬x << z would also be regionally valid. But it is not, as the previous assignment 
of values to the variables shows. Indeed, multiple instances of the argument from {¬x << y, 
¬y << z} to ¬x << z generate a sorites paradox, in the same way as before. Once again, from 
the example one can easily construct counterexamples to the meta-rules of conditional 
proof, contraposition, argument by cases, and existential elimination too.
4. Morals
The evidence from §3 confirms Graff Fara’s claim that the potential for violations of stand-
ard meta-rules by material forms of validity is extremely widespread. It extends to ordinary 
cases of ambiguity, to quantifier rules, and to many mathematical contexts. What morals 
should we draw from this?
Graff Fara is clearly right that in practice we rarely care whether our deductions are 
valid by a purely logical standard or a looser, context-dependent one, reliant on background 
assumptions. We are fine with arguments like ‘She lives in Paris, so she lives in France’, de-
spite their invalidity by a strictly logical standard. Even working mathematicians rarely care 
whether their proofs are logically valid, so long as they are mathematically valid. For exam-
ple, they do not normally differentiate in status between standard set-theoretic principles, 
such as the power-set axiom, and purely logical principles, such as the law of excluded mid-
dle. They treat them all as part of the assumed background. A non-logical, material stand-
ard of consequence is operative.
Suppose that, in a vague and sometimes ambiguous language, our deductive reasoning 
tends to accord with material regional validity: we tend to accept materially regionally valid 
deductions and reject materially regionally invalid ones. We must therefore be implicitly 
avoiding numerous nearby instances of the meta-rules that would take us from materially 
regionally valid arguments to materially regionally invalid ones. Yet, on the face of it, we 
freely apply conditional proof, reductio ad absurdum, contraposition, argument by cases, 
and existential elimination, without specially checking whether the instance in question is 
problematic for supervaluationist reasons. Did you monitor the purely technical parts of 
this paper for such fallacies? (Supervaluationists would in fact accept the informal proofs.)
Obviously, in practice we rarely insert ‘definitely’ into the input or output of the me-
ta-rules to ensure (material) regional validity. Do we instead apply qualified versions of the 
meta-rules with extra conditions on the status of the input argument, such as McGee and 
McLaughlin and others impose? Such proposals typically require the input argument to 
meet a more demanding standard of validity than regional validity. Thus, if ordinary rea-
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soners pay attention to regional validity at all, they must keep track of two standards of va-
lidity, and of which arguments meet which standard, if they are to be in a position to apply 
the qualified versions of conditional proof, reductio ad absurdum, contraposition, argu-
ment by cases, and existential elimination. In particular, they must be sensitive to the status 
of some of their arguments as merely regionally valid: good enough for the truth of their 
conclusions given the truth of their premises, but not good enough to serve as inputs to the 
qualified meta-rules. That we habitually do any such thing is far from obvious. If mathema-
ticians assign such a differential status to some of their proofs, why do they never speak of 
it?
One hypothesis is that we accept regionally valid arguments, and make free but illicit 
use of the unqualified meta-rules, because we are unaware of the fallacies. On that hypoth-
esis, our reasoning should get us into serious trouble. Does it? A first thought is that we do 
get into serious trouble: slippery slopes and sorites paradoxes. However, it is not clear that 
our problems there depend on illicit use of the meta-rules. For if they do, why are the prob-
lems so limited, when their cause is almost ubiquitous? Why do mathematicians not get 
into trouble with their use of symbols like ≈ and <<? After all, mathematicians are the peo-
ple who give our patterns of deductive reasoning their most systematic and severe stress-
testing.
Consider ambiguity as a toy model of vagueness, as supervaluationists such as Fine have 
done. Of course, ambiguity does sometimes get us into trouble: there are fallacies of equiv-
ocation. Sometimes we argue from α to β(e), using the expression e in one sense, and then 
from β(e) to γ, using e in another sense, and put the two arguments together to make an 
argument from α to γ that is not truth-preserving on any sense of e (which is absent from 
both α and γ). But our problem there does not depend on any of the meta-rules that fail for 
material regional validity. Once we recognize the ambiguity in an expression, we are not 
tempted to reason with it according to material regional validity. This argument is an ex-
ample (with no shift of reference in ‘that’):
Argument BANK
That is a bank.
Therefore, that is both a financial bank and a river bank.
BANK is untempting, to say the least. However one disambiguates the premise, the con-
clusion does not follow, even materially. Yet BANK is materially regionally valid, on a su-
pervaluationist treatment of ambiguity: if the premise is true on both disambiguations, the 
conclusion is true (compare §3.2, [a] and [b]). Of course, committed supervaluationists 
may be able to talk themselves into accepting the validity of BANK. But it does not come 
naturally to reason according to BANK.
The same goes for vagueness proper. For instance, when I think as a mathematician, I 
feel no temptation to regard {x ≈ y, y ≈ z, ¬x ≈ z} as an inconsistent set. After all, the sym-
bol ≈ means approximate equality, and who expects approximate equality to be transitive? 
Similarly, Graff Fara’s argument IIB does not come naturally, despite its material regional 
validity in a suitable context. The obvious hypothesis as to why our free, unqualified use of 
the meta-rules does not get us into trouble is that we do not accept the materially regionally 
valid input arguments that make the trouble. Supervaluationism is far more revisionary of 
our current practice than supervaluationists like to assume.
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Ought we to tailor our deductive practices to material regional validity? Its failure to 
validate conditional proof, reductio ad absurdum, contraposition, argument by cases, and 
existential elimination is a strong reason not to. As already noted, using the qualified ver-
sions instead of them carries a heavy cognitive burden, for no clear gain.14
I will not labour the case. Graff Fara’s point goes too deep for any technical fix. Super-
valuationists need to undertake a far more searching investigation of what our deductive 
practice would really be like if properly tailored to context-dependent material regional va-
lidity. In this, as in so much else, she has left us a rewarding challenge for the future.15
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